I. INTRODUCTION
Otto von Bismarck is rumored to have quipped that "legislation is like sausage: it's better not to watch it being made."
1 It may well have been sound advice when the laws were made in service of a monarchy without much consideration of the views or desires of the populace. Americans, however, "have ignored this advice and have widely subscribed to the view that a truly democratic people must have access to governmental decision-making . . . ." 2 Yet, despite an expectation of public participation, in reality the public is often shut out from the legislative process. This exclusion creates three distinct though interrelated problems, especially when Congress legislates in areas that deal with science and technology. First, when Congress legislates in these areas, it tends to prove Bismarck correct because it legislates in the dark, without understanding the underlying issues or the full impact that legislation is likely to have on the progress of sciences. 3 Second, even when Congress is aware of the potential negative effect that the legislation will have on the progress of sciences, it often prefers not to acknowledge that effect, instead focusing on the benefits that the bill would bring to certain political constituencies. 4 This lack of recognition of the negative effects in turn diminishes Congress's democratic accountability because Congress never faces a definitive warning about the scientific effects of its legislative activity. In other words, the fact that Congress ignored a warning from experts would allow the public to conclude that a law's negative effects were not "unintended consequences," but instead, a case of willful disregard of expert opinion. Third, the current legislative process tends to diminish trust in the system because the affected parties do not believe that they had opportunities to convey their concerns or that their concerns were considered. The solution, however, is not to avert our gaze, as Bismarck recommended, but to improve the process so that the result is as worthy as sausages are tasty.
Congress enacts, on a nearly continuous basis, a variety of laws that affect scientific research and progress. Some of these laws have an unquestionably positive effect. For instance, Congress's creation of the National Institutes of Health, 5 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 6 and NASA; 7 its various appropriations to fund ground-breaking research;
8 and a multitude of other laws have incalculably advanced human knowledge, and it is to Congress's great credit that these laws have been and are continuing to be enacted. However, not all laws that affect the progress of sciences are an unalloyed good. Quite the opposite, often 3 See Cornelia Dean, Groups Call for Scientists to Engage the Body Politic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, at D1 (" [A] ccording to the Congressional Research Service, the technically trained among the 435 members of the House include one physicist, 22 people with medical training (including 2 psychologists and a veterinarian), a chemist, a microbiologist and 6 engineers."). 4 Cf. Megan Creek Frient, Note, Similar Harm Means Similar Claims: Doing Away with Davis v. Bandemer's Discriminatory Effect Requirement in Political Gerrymandering Cases, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 617, 644-45 (1998) ("Since the incumbent from the politically gerrymandered district knows he or she represents an area which has been crafted so that a majority of the residents share his or her political views, the representative has no incentive to acknowledge other voters' concerns: Safe districts remove the incentive to grant political concessions to constituent interests or create electoral coalitions [that] ensure representation of diverse points of view. In fact, granting the minority party's point of view deference in a gerrymandered district would be foolish. The representative would risk offending the constituents whose support the district was designed to guarantee." (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 the laws aim to, and in fact do, retard the progress of scientific research. 9 The question is, then, whether the benefit from those laws outweighs the costs imposed on scientific progress. At one extreme, consider the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 10 The treaty certainly had the effect of limiting the study of nuclear physics. 11 Yet, there is some value in banning nuclear tests, and Congress has attempted to strike a balance between the two. 12 The problem is that too many laws are enacted without any serious consideration of these costs and benefits because these laws are written and passed without the full understanding or acknowledgment of the impact that they will have on scientific research. 13 These problems can be ameliorated by furnishing unbiased scientific analysis to Congress, provided that such analysis is furnished in a language that is both neutral and comprehensible to an average member of Congress. Members of Congress, of course, would not be obliged to change their vote on the basis of any particular report, but the very presence of such a report would provide a solid political basis on which to evaluate the member's commitment to science and scientific progress. Furthermore, to the extent that Congress deliberately rejects 9 See Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. L.J. 1341, 1366 (1987) ("To give examples of legal restrictions on technology is to survey much of modern American law. . . . Food and drug law has become recognized as a discrete area of study that includes cases where new products have been delayed in reaching the market or prevented from doing so altogether. In other areas, ranging from communications to computers, regulation is a fact of modern life. At the state level, statutes and judicial decisions, concerning, for example, malpractice, products liability, and exposure to radioactive materials, have subjected technology to extraordinarily close scrutiny."). 10 [T] he nuclear weapons problem is one that deeply implicates science and technology. A relevant role from modern international law is to come to grips with the possibilities and limitations of science and technology in order to provide the goal guidance that is both relevant and steeped in realism."); Eric Schmitt, Experts Say Test Ban Could Impair Nuclear-Arms Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A11. 12 For example, the United States ratified the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 10, but balked at ratifying the new Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See 145 CONG. REC. 25,143 (1999) (rejecting the Treaty by a vote of forty-eight to fifty-one). One of the reasons for the opposition to the Treaty was the stated effect on scientific testing. See Schmitt, supra note 11.
13 See Valerie M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of Biotechnology Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183, 191-92 (1987) ("Scientists argue that risks of experimentation in biotechnology cannot be discussed rationally unless participants understand the subject matter. . . . According to many scientists, rapidly-moving research simply is not amenable to safety regulations by nonscientific decision makers. . . . Public participants in scientific discussions tend to be intimidated by scientists, and are hesitant to raise technical issues for fear of embarrassment." (footnotes omitted)).
warnings provided in any such analysis, the judiciary will be able to better evaluate whether Congress actually meant to reach what may in a vacuum be viewed as "absurd results." 14 In other words, if Congress actually considered a particular result and determined that the occurrence of such a result is not problematic, the courts would then be hard pressed to hold that this very result is "absurd." This Article proposes the creation of an advisory body-the Congressional Scientific Office-that would be able to provide unbiased scientific advice to members of Congress with respect to any pending bill or amendment. Such an advisory body would greatly improve the legislative process, as well as have a beneficial effect on the ability of the public to hold their elected representatives accountable for the votes these representatives cast.
Part II discusses what the general public often learns about the lawmaking process versus the actual reality of the process. According to civics textbooks, the lawmaking process begins in a committee where the proposal is carefully studied, debated, amended, and voted on. Then, the process is repeated on the floor of the House of Representatives and then again, from scratch, in the Senate. The reality, of course, is much different. First, bills often skip the committee process, and amendments are often added last minute without a chance for a meaningful debate. But even where the process is followed, it is often hard to portray the committee hearings as a true deliberative process. Instead, they are often described as a Kabuki theater, 15 where the chair and the ranking member designate the witnesses they wish to call to support the preformulated position. 16 Interested parties cannot provide testimony unless asked to do so by the relevant committee. 17 761-62 (1996) ("Because of the unique control that committee chairs have over the design and content of hearingsincluding who testifies and on what-testimony at hearings may be viewed as simply an additional forum for interest group influence in the form of witnesses. It is up to the chair to decide the extent to which individuals will be heard by the committee or to which their written views will be placed in the committee record. . . . In general, the committee chair retains power to set the agenda and format of any hearings and determine all witnesses in consultation with the ranking member of the minority party on the committee."). 17 See into account, precisely because no one asked the right question, there was no one in the room to answer it, and perhaps the sponsors of legislation did not want to hear the answer. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment has stymied research in areas such as fertility, assisted reproductive technologies, and stem cells, all because of Congress's basic lack of understanding of the underlying scientific principles.
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Part IV of the Article proposes a solution to the problem. Bills that affect the progress of science ought to be evaluated by an independent body similar to the Congressional Budget Office. 28 Like the CBO, this body would not have any authority to block a bill, but it would be able to "score" it (i.e., provide information on the effect the bill will have on research). 29 In order to accomplish its task, this newly created body would be required to provide notice of pending legislation and then seek comments from the interested parties, much like what is done in the administrative rulemaking process. 30 The comments would then be collected and analyzed with the final report presented to Congress before it votes. Congress will continue to be able to vote as it pleases, but with this process in place, it will be forced to do so with its eyes wide open. By understanding the full scope and the implication for the scientific progress of the bills it wishes to enact, Congress will produce better legislation, which will be less detrimental to scientific progress. If representatives choose to ignore the opinions of experts, voters will be able to hold their representatives accountable.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: MYTHS AND REALITIES
Millions of Americans think of the legislative process by reference to Schoolhouse Rock's I'm Just a Bill 31 and Jimmy Stewart's Mr. Smith Goes to Washington. 32 The process that is imprinted in the public's mind is one with exhaustive debates in the committees and on the floor, where the views of people, most likely to be affected by the legislation and most knowledgeable in the subject matter, provide input to Congress before a congressional determination is made. membership on a certain committee that is supposedly relevant to the specific concerns of the congressman's district, and even C-SPAN programming that shows committee hearings where congressmen and senators hear testimony and question proponents and opponents of proposed bills. With such media presentations, the public can be forgiven for thinking that each bill undergoes serious scrutiny and debate before being voted on and enacted into law. The reality, however, is quite different.
In the last few years, congressional hearings have often been called "Kabuki theater" 34 or a "dog and pony show." 35 While the moniker is most often applied to the judicial confirmation hearings, 36 the same is true about all other hearings. 37 The hearings are no longer designed to elicit unbiased expert testimony to aid the deliberative process, but rather to provide support for preexisting political viewpoints. 38 The appearance of witnesses in the congressional hearings is not a matter of right for the public, but a matter of prerogative for committee chairs and ranking members. 39 The chairman is a particularly powerful figure in the committee with the authority to decide not only which proposals are considered and in what order (or for that matter whether they are considered at all), but also which witnesses he will call and to what they will testify. 40 The exercise of this power was on display when the late Senator Jesse Helms, the then- Mexico. 41 When Senator Helms's Republican colleagues rebelled against this approach, Senator Helms was forced to hold a hearing. 42 However, at that hearing, it was not Governor Weld who testified in support of his nomination. 43 Rather, Senator Helms engaged in a soliloquy about the Senate traditions of allowing the committee chairmen to refuse to bring up matters for hearings or votes and then adjourned the hearing when he was done.
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A committee chairman also has the authority to draft a bill on his own and have that bill form the basis of discussions, rather than what may have been debated in a subcommittee or during the initial hearings in the full committee. 45 Thus, the chairman has a near complete control of the scope and substance of discussion that takes place in the committee. 46 The modern absurdity of committee hearings is perhaps best illustrated by the appearance of the comedian Stephen Colbert in front of the House Judiciary Committee in September of 2010. 47 Mr. Colbert used the opportunity to mock Congress and the process of considering bills. 48 Mr. Colbert, however, did not just arrive at the hearing room unannounced. He was invited by the subcommittee Chair, the long-serving Representative Zoe Lofgren. 49 Instead of a real debate on the merits of the Farm Bill, the committee (and by extension, the public) was treated to a mocking performance of a satirist. What's more, committee hearings are rarely fully attended by the committee members. 51 In some ways, this is not surprising given that each member of Congress serves on a number of committees. 52 The supposed deliberations then are actually quite often just a show, with most of the work done not out in the open by the people responsible to the electorate, but by the staffers. 53 While staffers may consult with experts in the field, 54 they need not do so, and even when they do consult-because whatever advice is obtained comes through private communications-there is little chance to test these communications against criticism and opposing viewpoints. 55 Instead, the more likely outcome is epistemic closure where the preplanned political outcome is justified by reference to selective presentation of information and arguments. 56 This situation would be bad enough, but that is merely the beginning of failures in the legislative process. Several additional factors ensure the bills that come up for votes on the floor of each house are not subject to full debate, scrutiny, and relevant data. In the House of Representatives, before being reported to the floor, each bill has to be considered and reported by the Committee on Rules.
59 Whereas the various committees with subject matter jurisdiction are at least nominally specialized-with representatives assigned based on specific interest in the matters within committee's jurisdiction and staffers being drawn from the pool of individuals with specialized knowledge in these matters-the Rules Committee is a purely political tool designed to allow the Speaker of the House to keep control of the bills brought to the floor. 60 The Rules Committee's power over all bills is nearly limitless:
The [Rules] Committee has the authority to do virtually anything during the course of consideration of a measure, including deeming it passed. The Committee can also include a self-executed amendment which could rewrite just parts of a bill, or the entire measure. In essence, so long as a majority of the House is willing to vote for a special rule, there is little that the Rules Committee cannot do.
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Despite this power, the Committee does not spend much time considering the bills that it reports to the floor. 62 Nor does it often hear outsiders' testimony.
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Instead, the individuals testifying before the Rules Committee are usually other members of Congress that urge the committee to allow (or disallow) consideration of certain amendments on the House floor. 64 Despite the lack of deep familiarity or the factual background behind the bills, the Rules Committee can-and doesrewrite bills it considers, even when such bills have been painstakingly developed on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers" in the committee of jurisdiction. 65 This makes the final product even less deliberative and more political-in the worst sense of the word.
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The Senate does not have a counterpart to the House Rules Committee. 67 Nonetheless, the Senate has its own methods of skirting committees of jurisdiction. The Senate majority leader controls the Senate's calendar. 68 The majority leader decides when to call up each bill, irrespective of whether it has been fully vetted (or for that matter, vetted at all) by the committee of jurisdiction. 69 In other words, a bill can be written, introduced, and then immediately called up for consideration, thus bypassing any hearings or opportunity-such as it is-for interested members of the public to offer their views and criticism. 70 To be fair, the Senate rules do allow senators to force extended-and nearly limitless-debate on any bill, thus providing a bit of a safety check against bills being rushed through without due consideration. 71 That said, the length of the debate and speechifying-often to an otherwise empty chamber 72 -does not necessarily enhance the quality of the debate or allow experts, individuals, or groups most affected by the proposed legislation to offer their views or describe the likely effect the proposed legislation will have.
Related to the aforementioned problems is the fact that Congress has, over the decades, blurred the traditional line between authorizing legislation and appropriating legislation. Professor Richard Lazarus describes the distinction between the two types of bills and the consequences that flow from each:
The decision whether to pass authorizing legislation, such as the Clean Air Act, its detailed amendments, or any other kind of substantive legislation, is almost always entirely discretionary. Because relatively few federal statutes . . . have sunset provisions, congressional failure to pass a new authorization statute preserves the status quo. The absence of legislative action does not create a disruptive legal vacuum. Congress need not formally reauthorize either the Clean Water Act or the Clean Air Act after a statutorily prescribed number of years for those laws to remain in effect. Hence, those seeking to pass a new authorization statute invariably face the heavy burden of demonstrating why a change is necessary.
Precisely the converse is true when appropriations legislation is at stake. There is enormous political pressure to pass annual appropriations legislation because, absent its passage, the status quo is not maintained. Instead, there is a very real threat of a complete shutdown of the federal government. If the deadline for the annual appropriations bill is not met, then to avoid a shutdown Congress must at a minimum pass a continuing resolution to appropriate funds for a few more weeks or months as necessary to keep an agency in operation until passage of the annual appropriations bill.
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As a result of the "must-pass" nature of the appropriation bills, "it is tempting to try to attach incidental provisions that otherwise might lack the political momentum (or even majority support) necessary for passage."
74 These riders can often be no different than stand-alone "substantive" bills, but because they are attached to appropriation bills, rather than authorization legislation, they are not considered in the committee of jurisdiction over the substantive matter. If they are considered in the committee at all, it is in the Committee on Appropriations. 75 Quite often, these riders are not even considered in the Appropriations Committee, but rather are added last minute during the floor debates and votes. 76 Again, in either case, the legislators are deprived of the considered views of those whom the legislation is likely to affect. 74 Id. at 635. 75 See id. at 636. Of course, any rider that is part of the annual appropriations bill would expire at the same time as the underlying bill would. Thus, such riders would have to be renewed from year to year if they are to continue in force. 76 See id. at 648-53. 77 See id.
A final stage at which bills can be amended without much public input or debate is a conference committee formed to negotiate over different versions of a bill passed by the House and the Senate. 78 Much like the House of Representative's Committee on Rules, conference committees have an almost unlimited authority to rewrite or modify a pending bill, 79 and they can do so in near-total secrecy, 80 for meetings of conference committees are generally not open to the public, at least not for the purposes of giving testimony and illuminating the full scope of effects that the bill (or any modifications thereto) would have. 81 In short, the informed, deliberative process that the public is taught to expect is quite often anything but that. Instead, the process is often much more haphazard, ill-informed, and subject to hijacking by individuals who may not understand the full impact of the very legislation for which they support and vote. Furthermore, the current process allows congressmen to obscure and obfuscate politically inconvenient facts. By refusing to bring forth witnesses, Congress can create legislative history that is willfully barren of countervailing facts. In those situations, the problem is not that congressmen do not understand the implications of the legislation, but that they willfully refuse to acknowledge those implications.
This degradation of the deliberative process has several effects. It results in legislators being presented with limited and incomplete information and, consequently, congressmen voting on bills without fully realizing the downside of their votes. These votes may well be cast differently if information presented were 78 See THECAPITOL.NET, supra note 45 ("A temporary, ad hoc panel composed of House and Senate conferees that is formed for the purpose of reconciling differences in legislation that has passed both chambers."). 79 See more complete. 82 That said, the linkage is not always true. It may well be that congressmen would vote the same way no matter how much information were available and how many people testified in front of their committee. Congressmen may aim to please their political supporters and discount the costs that such legislation may impose on the rest of society. 83 Additional information or broadening the spectrum of participants in the legislative process is unlikely to change legislators' basic incentives. 84 What additional information may do, however, is focus congressmen's attention on the broader effect that the legislation will have, beyond merely pleasing political allies. Once such effects are brought into focus, congressmen at least would have to justify their decision to ignore these effects, while the electorate will be able to pass judgment on whether such justifications withstand scrutiny. The next Part provides a glaring example of how these problems affect legislation and cause injury to the progress of science.
III. THE DICKEY-WICKER AMENDMENT

A. The Amendment and Its History
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the legislative process is either irreparably broken or that the process itself is worthless. Indeed, with respect to most matters addressed by the legislature, the legislative process works the way it is intended to. Much of what Congress does centers on value judgments about the appropriate role of government, level of taxation, proper foreign policy, etc. 83 See Lindsay Warren Bowen, Jr., Note, Givings and the Next Copyright Deferment, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 821 (2008) (discussing Congress's response to "small, politically powerful group of copyright holders," despite the fact that such a response "harms society by allowing copyright holders to charge artificially high prices and by restraining the creation of new works based on copyrighted material"); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOWA L. REV. 79, 122 (1997) ("The electoral system is often singled out as the key source of relevant institutional incentives for politicians, given the assumption that the President and members of Congress will inevitably seek to reward the constituencies that elected them. . . . The pressure on members of Congress is particularly intense when the benefits of a governmental policy are concentrated and the costs are spread widely among members of the public, for in such cases, private interests have a strong motivation to organize to seek benefits."). 84 See Sargentich, supra note 83, at 122 (noting that because of reelection concerns, "members of Congress will inevitably seek to reward the constituencies that elected them"). 85 In those circumstances, congressional majorities are primarily concerned with building public support for their proposed public policy solutions. 86 In that posture, the "dog and pony" congressional hearings make perfect sense. The hearings there are not meant to illuminate the issues for debate, but rather to bolster the political support for (or to drum up opposition to) a preformulated political position. 87 Congress, in making its decisions, does have to rely on its understanding of the facts as they exist in the real world. When the facts are common or undisputed knowledge (e.g., the distance between two cities, the number of days in a year, or the revenues and expenditures of the government in the years past), there is not much danger that Congress will misunderstand the content, scope, or the import of the factual basis (though, of course, it may choose to assign whatever weight it chooses to these facts). However, when the facts concern complicated scientific issues requiring specialized knowledge for full comprehension, congressmen, usually untrained in science, are unlikely to fully understand either the predicate for their actions or the full effect that the actions will have. 88 As a result, Congress often enacts laws that have a devastating effect on the speed and scope of scientific progress. It does so not out of any malice for scientific advances, but out of misunderstanding of the issues.
The Dickey-Wicker Amendment ("DWA") 89 is a perfect example of Congress acting without understanding the full effect that the legislation would have on scientific exploration. Since 1974, federal law had already imposed restrictions on the use of federal funds with respect to fetal research. 90 Those restrictions have been part and parcel of the abortion debate and legislative skirmishes. 91 In the legislation is generally reasonable largely depends on value judgments that vary from nation to nation." 1990s, however, as scientific horizons began to expand and the research began to focus on the earliest stages of human development, the ethical and political concerns over such research began to extend not just to fetal tissue, but also to embryonic tissue. The issue was studied by the National Institute of Health's ("NIH") Human Embryo Research Panel, composed of nineteen leading scientists and ethicists. 92 The panel issued its report on September 27, 1994, and recommended making federal funding available for research using "spare" embryos, embryos obtained from consenting IVF patients, embryos created specifically for research, and research using parthenotes. 93 This Part discusses the science of parthenotes and why the distinction is important, despite being overlooked by Congress. President Clinton declined to follow the recommendation in full, and under the executive order issued in 1994, federal funding was not made available for embryos created specifically for research. 94 What is interesting about President Clinton's executive order was that it was made after a period of study, comments, and a report by a body of experts.
95 Nevertheless, the fact that the President did not fully endorse the recommendations of the expert panel does not diminish the importance of having had the benefit of the expert input.
Congress, however, was not satisfied with President Clinton's compromise. In response, in 1996, it enacted the DWA. 96 The DWA prohibited funding for any research that involved "(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or (2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death . . . ."
97 The DWA defined "human embryo" as "any organism . . . that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes." 98 Report, there is no evidence that it ever considered the findings of the report or the distinctions drawn therein. The reason is that the DWA, because it was a "rider" on a must-pass appropriations bill, 99 was never debated in any committee or on the floor. Instead, it was attached to a bill that resolved the "longest federal government shutdown in American history." 100 The entire Act was introduced, debated, and voted on in the House of Representatives in fewer than two and a half hours. 101 The Senate considered the entirety of the bill, including three separate amendments (none of which dealt with embryonic research) and voted on it the next day.
102 President Clinton signed it immediately upon the Senate's passage.
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This legislative rider has been reenacted every year since. 104 As with the initial enactment, there is no evidence that the amendment was ever debated in any committee or on the floor of either house.
The DWA and its restrictions became particularly salient in 1998 with the discovery of a successful method to isolate and grow human embryonic stem cells using cell culture. 105 Embryonic stem cells are a potential treasure trove of future research and treatment.
106 Three different presidents have had to issue contradictory statements on NIH funding of such research. 107 The most recent NIH 109 The D.C. Circuit disagreed that the language was sufficiently clear to allow only one interpretation, thus permitting the challenged regulations to stand. 110 The point is that because Congress never debated the DWA, it has never made a record as to what evils it was meant to prevent, leaving each administration somewhat free to adopt broad or narrow interpretation of the law and to fund or not fund various research projects. This, of course, is highly detrimental to the scientific community, which, as a result, is plagued by uncertainty over whether research will continue to be funded or whether the change in administration will result in a funding cutoff. With scientific progress dependent on long-term research projects, this state of affairs is hardly ideal.
B. The Science of Parthenotes
The DWA is part of the perennial fight and debate over abortion and the question of when life actually begins. 111 To be sure, these are not scientific issues and are not amenable to any falsifiable experimentation.
112 As the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out, even "those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus" as to when life begins. 113 In that sense, the DWA's effect on science and scientific exploration is secondary to its proponents. 114 Nonetheless, even those who espouse the view that life begins at conception and merits protection from that point in time do not generally take the view that research on any cell that contains the full complement of human chromosomes is improper. 115 alternative to embryonic research. 116 The reason for treating embryos (even single cell ones) differently from other cells with full chromosomal complement is the notion that embryos, given enough time and the right environment, can develop into full adult human organism, whereas other cells cannot do so. It is for this reason that the two sets of cells that would otherwise look nearly identical under the microscope are accorded a different moral status. 117 The moral and philosophical aspects of this valuation, however, are undergirded by a purely factual scientific inquiry: Can this particular cell develop into an adult human organism? If so, then, and only then, does it stand on a higher moral plane. 118 Thus, in order to make that judgment, an individual needs to be familiar with the answers to certain basic scientific questions. Unfortunately, the Congress that enacted the DWA (and subsequent Congresses) never considered this issue when they enacted the broad funding prohibition that covered research on parthenotes.
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Had Congress understood the nature and the science of parthenotes and parthenogenesis, the scope of the DWA may have well been narrower, and the effect on scientific exploration less pronounced.
Parthenogenesis is a portmanteau 120 derived from Greek parthenos, meaning virgin, and genesis, meaning birth. 121 The term is used to denote asexual reproduction. 122 Unlike sexual reproduction that involves the contribution of genetic materials from both an egg and a sperm, parthenogenesis involves contribution from the egg only. 123 and is common to a number of invertebrate species. 124 It is also present in all classes of vertebrates, excepting mammals. 125 In nonmammals, this form of reproduction "can occur spontaneously (i.e., naturally) as a continuous reproductive strategy or as a response to environmental or nutritional changes." 126 In mammals (of which humans are, of course, part), spontaneous parthenogenesis cannot result in a viable full-term offspring because this form of reproduction has been, evolutionary speaking, abandoned.
127 Instead, when mammalian ova get spontaneously activated, they result not in an offspring, but in an ovarian tumor. 128 Thus, spontaneous parthenogenesis can occur in humans, but it is not a genesis or birth of a new life, but rather of cancerous lesions.
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Parthenotes (defined as ova activated via parthenogenesis) also can be created in vitro "through chemical stimuli that mimic fertilization, but the lack of required genetic imprinting rules out further development."
130 These "activated" ova begin to divide as if they were fertilized, but the division is halted at an early stage of cell differentiation, eventually resulting in the death of the parthenote. 131 Thus, human parthenotes, whether created spontaneously in vivo or during the course of an experiment in vitro, intrinsically are incapable of becoming viable human embryos.
132 Their potential for developing into an adult organism is no greater than the potential of an unfertilized egg or a tumor cell. Yet, despite this obvious difference between parthenotes and embryos, the DWA treats them as one and the same, and it does so without anyone in Congress ever explicitly considering this difference.
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While parthenotes are not a perfect research substitute for embryos, they do have their valuable uses. First, because parthenotes do involve the initial activation of an ovum, they can be used to study the early stages of pregnancy and embryonic development. 134 For instance, it has been reported that implantation of fertilized eggs as part of Assisted Reproductive Technology ("ART") processes often fail because the egg activation process does not function properly. 135 Studying the intricacies of that process would help perfect ART processes and ultimately lead to higher rate of success with in vitro fertilization and, therefore, less abandoned or "spare" embryos. Second, parthenotes are useful in studying miscarriages. 137 Some research suggests that many miscarriages are due to the "very early loss of nonviable parthenotes caused by spontaneous egg activation in the female."
138 Identifying a biological marker that differentiates parthenotes from fertilized ova would help study the causes of miscarriage. 139 Third, parthenotes are useful in studying certain tumors. 140 As mentioned previously, in mammals, spontaneous in vivo parthenogenesis leads not to an offspring, but to a gonadal tumor. 141 Despite tremendous advances in knowledge about cancer causes and treatments, it is still one of the most complicated diseases from the viewpoint of its etiology, diagnosis, and progression, as well as its treatment.
142 Any advances in understanding cancer processes, its diagnosis, and treatment would be valuable for the preservation of both extant human life, as well as potential human life, by helping to preserve fertility in the affected population.
Finally, parthenotes may serve as a source of stem cells akin to those extracted from embryos. 143 It is generally believed that stem cell research can lead to breakthrough advances in the understanding and treatment of spinal cord injuries, Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson disease, and a number of other ailments. 144 Whereas extraction of embryonic stem cells generally involves destroying an embryo, thus raising the concerns about the destruction of potential viable human life, 145 extraction of similar stem cells from parthenotes avoids these concerns because, as discussed previously, human parthenotes are never viable and will not, under any circumstances, develop into an adult human. 146 Thus, parthenotes can be a point of compromise between proponents of full federal funding for embryonic stem cell research and opponents of such funding.
All of these advances are now precluded because of the broad language of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment-a provision that was enacted with no debate and no understanding of the crucial biological differences between embryos and parthenotes.
This Article does not take a specific position on the propriety of embryonic or parthenote research 147 counted, one side has to win, and the other has to lose. That has to happen even if there has been the most exhaustive and informative of debates. The point is not that the decision on the DWA necessarily should have been different either in whole or in part. It may very well be that even after hearing all of the arguments and scientific data differentiating parthenotes from embryos, Congress still would have enacted the DWA in its present form. One reason Congress could have done so is to create a "fence of protection" around human life, much like Talmudic scholars impose requirements on observant Jews that go beyond the bare minimum commands of the Torah, so as to make sure that the actual precepts are not violated. 148 Second, it is quite possible that even given an identical set of facts, people of different political and religious persuasions, after viewing the facts through their own lens, will come to radically different conclusions as to what is the "right solution"
149 and, therefore, choose not to fund parthenotes research. Third, it may well be that the political incentives of the DWA's proponents are such that they weigh heavily towards voting for the broadest possible ban irrespective of the cost imposed on scientific progress. 150 Ultimately, what form a decision on the DWA would have taken and whether such decision would have been a good one from the perspective of public policy is not what concerns me. Rather, my argument is that the decision, whatever it is, must be made after the legislators are fully apprised of the scientific underpinnings of their proposals and the likely effect that the proposal would have on the progress of sciences. In this way, congressmen would understand the full implication of their actions, and the public would be able to judge those actions against the complete set of facts. The next Part suggests how to ensure that this informational and deliberative part of the decision-making process actually occurs. 150 Nevertheless, the DWA was continued even when both chambers of Congress and the White House were controlled by the Democratic Party-the party generally less sympathetic to antiabortion and related legislation. Thus, it is unlikely that the Amendment can be explained purely by the desire of congressmen to please the politically allied antiabortion groups.
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL SCIENCE OFFICE AND LEGISLATIVE NOTICE AND COMMENT PROCESS
A. The Congressional Science Office
As Part II previously discussed, there are three distinct, major problems with congressional decision making, especially when it affects science. First, there is a lack of an independent, nonpartisan forum for discussing and evaluating proposals. Second, there is a lack of sufficient training in the subject matter of proposals to fully understand their scope; and third, there is no meaningful ability for the public to contribute to the debate and discussion of the proposals. Thus, any system designed to fix the current flaws would necessarily have to address each of these shortcomings. Luckily, there are systems currently in place that can be used as models for addressing the shortcomings in congressional deliberations when it comes to scientific issues. Specifically, the role and function of the Congressional Budget Office is a useful point of departure in creating a nonpartisan body of experts to advise Congress on specific and technical matters for which congressmen themselves may not have full appreciation.
The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") was created in 1974 by the Congressional Budget Act to provide "independent analyses of budgetary and economic issues to support the Congressional budget process. The agency is strictly nonpartisan and conducts objective, impartial analysis . . . ." 151 The CBO "produce[s] a formal cost estimate for nearly every bill that is 'reported' (approved) by a full committee of either House of Congress . . . ." 152 The CBO also provides an annual report called "Budget and Economic Outlook," which "includes projections of spending and revenues under current law over the next 10 years as well as an economic forecast . . . ."
153 Thus, the CBO evaluates not only likely prospective effects of proposed legislation, but also yearly reevaluates the effect of current policy and estimates the effect of these policies if they are continued. 154 Finally, the CBO "prepares analytic reports at the request of the Congressional leadership or Chairmen or Ranking Minority Members of committees or subcommittees." 155 These reports analyze proposals that may or may not be in a form of a formal bill or amendment but help congressmen evaluate ideas that are being discussed either formally or informally.
156
In producing its reports, the CBO relies on the internal government data available from agencies like the Census Bureau, Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Justice Statistics, etc.
Government agencies, however, are not the sole source of information for the CBO. A particularly interesting aspect of CBO's operation is that it "seeks input from outside experts, including professors, analysts at think tanks, private-sector experts, and employees at various government agencies." 158 This input "complement[s] the knowledge and insights of . . . the agency's staff."
159
The CBO reports are not "binding" on Congress in a sense that an unfavorable CBO "score" (i.e., a report that projects that a given proposal would increase the deficit) does not preclude Congress from adopting the proposed bill. 160 Indeed, Congress often votes to enact bills that increase the deficit. 161 Nonetheless, the CBO reports are discussed during the committee and floor debates, as well as during election campaigns. 162 As a result, the politicians, even when they ultimately decide to enact a law that is unfavorably scored by the CBO, must take that score into account and come up with coherent arguments as to why they voted the way they did. 163 Though there has been some criticism of the CBO's methods, 164 the CBO is generally viewed as a nonpartisan body, not beholden to either political party. 165 Indeed, despite the criticism leveled at the CBO, it is generally viewed as a neutral 158 Id. 159 Id. 167 The CBO's estimates are often the centerpiece of political and campaign debates, and members of both parties rely on them to tout their own agenda or to criticize their opponents' plans. 168 The CBO ensures that it remains a neutral arbiter (and is perceived as such) by limiting the political activities of its staff, 169 requiring that the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate appoint the Director of the Office after consultations with the members of the committees having jurisdiction over the budgetary matters, 170 giving the Director a fixed four-year term (irrespective of the political vicissitudes of the individuals originally responsible for the Director's appointment), 171 and seeking input from a variety of outside experts.
172 Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the CBO makes no policy recommendations to Congress. 173 Instead, the CBO's role is limited to evaluating and scoring congressional policy proposals.
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The CBO model is a good starting point for the creation of a system that would illuminate and evaluate congressional proposals that would have an effect on the progress of sciences. If Congress had a Congressional Science Office with a mission similar to that of a CBO, except on matters of science, the debates over legislation having impact on scientific progress would be better informed and more substantive. Indeed, there used to exist a similar congressional office. From 1972 to 1995, the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA") produced studies on a wide range of topics from acid rain, to payment for physician services, to wood use. 175 The new Republican majority abolished the OTA in 1995 as part of the 166 Id. 167 Westmoreland, supra note 160, at 1574 ("The near-constant carping by dissatisfied members of Congress, interest groups, or journalists that the CBO estimates are 'wrong' misses the point of the exercise. The CBO score is deemed to be correct by the agreements on how the budget process is to work, and all legislative rules and actions follow from it." (emphasis in original)).
168 See Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1426 (2011) ("Congress created the Congressional Budget Office and required the CBO to calculate the costs incurred over a four year period by each bill or joint resolution reported by any committee of the House or Senate. . . . The point of these disclosure requirements was to furnish Congress with detailed information concerning the budget consequences of proposed legislation so that its budget consequences form part of the legislative debate, and to provide an external measure of the budget consequences of enacted legislation."); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text. 169 176 The abolition of the office was criticized at the time, 177 and there have been calls to resurrect it. 178 A resurrected OTA would indeed be a good point of departure. However, the "new OTA," or Congressional Science Office ("CSO"), should have a somewhat different mission from the original OTA.
The original Office prepared reports on scientific issues of the day but without being tied to any specific legislation.
179 Such reports are certainly useful as background information and as prods for Congress to act on issues that they might not have otherwise considered. Nonetheless, for individuals lacking scientific or technical training (like most congressmen), 180 applying the background information to the specific legislative proposals is often just as difficult as acquiring the background knowledge in the first place. 181 For that reason, the recreated office would be more effective if its reports were directed to specific legislative proposals, rather than general scientific issues that may be of interest to Congress and the country. On a related note, an office that chooses on its own which subject matters to report is more open to the accusation of political bias.
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Even when the science found in the report is sound and the conclusions drawn are true, the very act of selecting on which topics to report-and, therefore, highlight in the public's mind-and which to omit may create an impression that certain issues are being given more importance for political reasons. 183 That is especially true when the issues are fairly politically sensitive. 184 On the other hand, when the CSO reports on every bill that has passed the committee of jurisdiction, as well as on any requests that are made of it by the Chairman and the Ranking Member of relevant committees, the CSO itself cannot be accused of picking and choosing which issues to highlight. Instead, they merely would be a responsive body, helping Congress understand both the scientific background in the relevant area and the likely impact of the proposed legislation. It would, however, remain entirely up to Congress whether and how much weight to give to these reports. What Congress would not be able to avoid is the debate over the actual merits of the proposed legislation, either in the halls of Congress or on the campaign trail.
Additionally, the CSO-much like the CBO-would report not only on pending bills, but also provide a year-end report on how the bills previously enacted have actually worked in the real world. Educated predictions as to the effect that legislation will have are certainly a valuable tool for legislators to decide how to vote on a pending bill, but reporting and evaluating actual effects will help legislators decide whether to renew expiring legislation and will also serve as an annual self-check on the CSO itself. By cross-checking its predictions with actual outcomes, the CSO will be better able to fine-tune its evaluative function and insulate itself from any charges of partisanship.
B. The Legislative Notice and Comment Process
The creation of a Congressional Science Office, charged with evaluating proposed legislation for impact on science in the same manner that the CBO evaluates proposed legislation for its impact on the budget, would solve the first problem with current congressional decision making in the scientific arena: the lack of an independent, nonpartisan forum for discussing and evaluating proposals. However, two additional problems would remain-the lack of sufficient training in the subject matter of proposals to fully understand their scope 185 and the lack of meaningful ability for the public to contribute to the debate and discussion of the proposals. 186 Of course, the staff of the CSO would have to have scientific, technical, or engineering training-much like the staff of the CBO must have training in economics. However, with scientific knowledge proliferating and progressing at an incredible pace, it would be quite hard to hire enough people to cover all possible fields of scientific exploration. Even if such coverage were possible, it is likely that the knowledge of the Office's staff would grow stale with time.
Thus, the mere existence of the CSO and quality staff, while going a long way to improving the understanding of the scope and effect of the legislative proposals, would still be insufficient to keep up with the emerging or rapidly changing 184 Id. at 21 (stating that much criticism was directed at the OTA following its negative review of the Strategic Defense Initiative-a top Republican priority).
185 See Holt, supra note 178. 186 See supra notes 39, 54-56 and accompanying text.
technologies. The CSO would have to look beyond its own internal expertise. This Article has already discussed that the CBO does just that by seeking input of independent experts of various political stripes in making its projections. 187 While that approach is laudable, it is not sufficient in the context of evaluating the impact of legislation on scientific progress. Furthermore, if the CSO were able to pick its own experts-especially on highly charged issues (e.g., embryonic research, global warming, human subject research, etc.)-it could be open to the accusation of bias in its selection. 188 If such an outcome were to come to pass, it would undermine the legitimacy of the CSO and its evaluations. Thus, in my view, the participation in evaluating the impact of proposed legislation on matters of science should be broader. Broader engagement would also address the current lack of meaningful opportunity for the public to participate in the shaping of legislative decisions. The question is how does one achieve broad participation that results in informative and valuable input into the ultimate product-the CSO's formal evaluation of legislative proposals?
One way to involve the interested and informed public in crafting legal language has been successfully tried in the administrative arena. The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 ("APA") 189 required agencies to give notice to the public on proposed rules, to allow the public to comment on the proposal, and to consider the comments before issuing a final rule. "[N]otice-andcomment rulemaking provides several interrelated benefits. It allows all stakeholders in a regulatory decision to be heard before a decision is made and ensures that the agency responds to relevant comments."
190 As the Fourth Circuit very recently pointed out,
The important purposes of this notice and comment procedure cannot be overstated. The agency benefits from the experience and input of comments by the public, which help ensure informed agency decisionmaking. The notice and comment procedure also is designed to encourage public participation in the administrative process. Additionally, the process helps ensure that the agency maintains a flexible and open-minded attitude towards its own rules, because the opportunity to comment must be a meaningful opportunity. First, the notice-and-comment process will, of necessity, slow down some legislative activity because some time will have to be allocated to actually receive and evaluate the comments. Though it is true that Congress has not been a bastion of rapid and efficient decision making, an additional brake on legislation that may have a far-reaching negative impact on science, technology, and medicine is a positive thing. As Professor Lazarus points out, oftentimes slowing down such laws simply preserves the legislative and legal status quo 197 -stability that is usually beneficial for scientific progress. 198 Second, by combining broader public participation with the reasoned responses both from other members of the public submitting responsive comments, as well as from the CSO, the notice-and-comment mechanism will lead to a broader acceptance of the legislative outcome. 199 By giving individuals a real voice in the legislative process, Congress will help grow confidence that, at least with respect to issues that turn on objective understanding of scientific realities and definitions, it has considered and properly weighed the objective evidence, even if a particular individual disagrees with the weight assigned to his or her own comments and arguments. 200 Additionally, under an open notice-and-comment regime, the CSO is less likely to be lobbied or captured by special interest groups. If the CSO, like an administrative agency, is required by its rules to "respond[] in a reasoned manner to significant comments received," 201 it will be less likely that a few influential individuals or groups would be able to sway the Office's views. Indeed, to the extent necessary, the Office can make the comments anonymous (beyond the educational and experience qualifications) so as to not be swayed by any personal connections or partisan leanings of the commenter. The fact that the CSO would not offer any policy prescriptions, but will limit itself only to analyzing legislation, will further insulate it from the danger of capture.
Third, and related to the second point, the ignoring of clear and specific criticisms and warnings issued by a neutral, nonpartisan body would serve as good fodder for intracongressional criticism, as well as campaign commercials. Much like candidates are now consistently criticized in campaign ads for disregarding the opinion of the CBO and voting for additional spending or tax cuts that have been scored as adding to the deficit, 202 so too will candidates be criticized for adopting legislation that the CSO warned would lead to slowing of scientific progress. This will be an especially potent tool if in its "progress reports," the CSO reconfirms its initial predictions.
Finally, to the extent the courts consider the "legislative history" of any particular enactment, especially when applying the Chevron analysis 203 to the administrative interpretations of the law (as was the case with Sherley v. Sebelius 204 ) or when attempting to figure out whether a particular interpretation would be an "absurd result," subject to the rule of the Church of the Holy Trinity, 205 the CSO reports would be of tremendous help. Courts will actually be able to see whether Congress was warned of the "absurd results" and whether it enacted legislation despite such warnings. 206 Similarly, the courts (and administrative agencies) will be able to better evaluate whether the language and intent of the statute is indeed ambiguous or whether the particular problem, in all its details, was considered by Congress and a definitive decision reached.
C. The Criticisms and a Response
Had the proposed notice and comment followed by a full CSO report procedure been in place in 1996, the DWA may have encountered a different fate, though there are no guarantees that it would necessarily have been so. On one hand, it is true that the legislative vehicle to which the DWA was attached was considered, voted on, enacted by Congress, and signed by the President in fewer than forty-eight hours, thus leaving very little time for any, much less exhaustive, debate on the riders attached to the bill. 207 Furthermore, given the "must-pass" nature of the bill and the background of the government shutdown that the bill was attempting to resolve, there was likely no appetite to debate the particulars.
Thus, the first objection is that it is unlikely that the process this Article proposes would have had much impact at that initial stage. Indeed, this criticism can be generalized to argue that the proposed process is unlikely to solve many problems and will accomplish little more than creating another government bureaucracy that will succeed only in the proliferation of reports that no one reads. While certainly the proposal is not a panacea to legislation gratuitously injurious to the progress of science, it is an improvement over the current process. In the case of the DWA, though Congress attached the rider to an emergency, must-pass bill, it does not mean that (a) the proposed system would have had no impact at all on the likelihood of DWA being enacted or (b) the DWA would have continued to survive, essentially unchanged, to the present day.
It is certainly the case that when operating under exceedingly narrow time constraints, the proposed CSO would not be able to engage in a full-blown notice-and-comment period, analysis of comments received, and creation of a comprehensive report for congressmen to debate and consider. But such situations arise presently both in Congress and also in the administrative agencies. The CBO often has to work under very tight time constraints to produce cost estimates for last-minute budgetary compromises. 208 Perhaps such reports are not as comprehensive as the reports that allow for more detailed study, broader consultations, and deeper reflection. But such reports are still given significant weight by congressmen and, eventually, the electorate. There is no reason to believe that the CSO would be unable to produce its own reports and estimates on an expedited basis, even if in those cases they would have to forgo the notice-andcomment mechanism. Similarly, administrative agencies also occasionally issue rules and regulations without engaging in the notice-and-comment process. The APA permits agencies to forego the process in "emergency situations." 209 This exception recognizes that though notice and comment is important, agencies do have their own expertise and can, in exceptional circumstances, be allowed to rely on that expertise alone. 210 These exceptions are generally permitted only when the promulgated rule is temporary, with the permanent rule subject to the full scope of the APA procedures.
Likewise, legislative riders on annual appropriations bills remain in effect only for so long as the underlying bill does, and because annual appropriations bills never last more than a year, neither do restrictions contained therein. Thus, though the initial restriction may have been enacted under emergency circumstances leaving no time for full public participation in the CSO process, nothing would prevent the CSO to conduct a full notice-and-comment procedure in anticipation of the rider potentially being renewed in a subsequent year. In emergency circumstances similar to the ones that attended the passage of the DWA, the initial report would potentially be truncated and somewhat superficial. In the long term, however, the process would still provide the benefits that this Article previously identifies. Relatedly, the CSO would be charged not just with making reports on pending bills, but also year-end estimates on the effect of all statutes presently in force (as they relate to science and technology). Thus, even if there were no opportunity to provide notice and comment at the time of a bill's initial consideration, there would still be an opportunity to comment on how the now-enacted bill has actually affected the progress of sciences, thus permitting Congress to reconsider the bill's scope when it comes up for reauthorization. Had this process been in place, the public would have had over a dozen annual opportunities to comment on the scope and effect of the DWA and explain the difference between parthenotes and embryos. Congress, presented with a formal report from the CSO would then have an opportunity to debate and rethink the renewal of the Amendment as originally written. Of course, Congress may well have remained unpersuaded, but at least congressmen would have to justify their approach to each other and/or their constituents.
The second objection to the proposed system-one that also casts doubt on the proposition that had the system been in place the DWA would have likely encountered a different fate-is that there are already ways for Congress to obtain detailed reports on matters of science and that an additional report-producing body would do little to change the legislative dynamic. After all, the National Institute of Health's Human Embryo Research Panel did issue a two-volume report on embryonic research, and that report did discuss the difference between parthenotes and embryos, 212 yet Congress enacted the DWA anyway. This Article readily concedes that Congress could ignore the reports of the CSO just like it ignored the report of the Human Embryo Research Panel. However, the adoption of the Article's proposed system would not be simply duplicative of existing resources and advisory bodies.
This Article again refers to the CBO. By the time the Congressional Budget Act created the CBO, the Office of Management and Budget had been in existence for over half a century. 213 Yet, Congress saw it fit to establish its own independent nonpartisan office. Though the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") is well respected, it is viewed as more partisan than the CBO. 214 It is now the CBO, not its older sibling the OMB, which has grown to be an authoritative arbiter on budgetary matters. 215 Perhaps this stems from the fact that Congress is by its very nature bipartisan (even when a single party has a majority in both chambers), and therefore, each party has to try to accommodate the other to a certain extent, whereas the presidency is, of necessity, unipartisan, and the President need not accommodate anyone in selecting those of his advisors that are not subject to Senate confirmation. The same dynamic is likely to play out with the CSO. Though Presidents have had various bodies advising them on scientific and bioethical issues since 1974, each President has changed the scope and the focus of these commissions, thus giving the commissions a flavor of partisanship and allegiance to the appointing administration's priorities. 216 In contrast, the proposed CSO would be charged with reporting on every bill having potential impact on science and technology, thus avoiding the perception that it is focusing on issues favored by a particular party or individual. Furthermore, the various presidential commissions were designed to recommend a specific course of action. Indeed, the present Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues was created explicitly to "offer[] practical policy options," to the administration. 217 Commissions with such charge can be perceived as having a stake in the political outcome rather than serving as a neutral evaluator of congressional proposals. That posture necessarily makes these bodies partisan, even if not in the traditional Republican or Democratic sense. Such a perception would undermine the value of the body to Congress and, therefore, to the legislative process.
Moreover, there is another reason that a Congress-based body for evaluating scientific issues is preferable to that based in the Executive Branch. As Congressman Rush Holt pointed out, Simply put, scientific advisors based in the Executive Branch (or independent of political branches altogether) are not ideal because they are insufficiently familiar with congressional procedures, schedules, and language to serve congressional needs. Furthermore, what Congress needs is not merely the ability to find general information on a particular topic. That is easy enough to do. What Congress needs is an evaluation of the likely effect a specific bill is likely to have on scientific progress. Indeed, though the Human Embryo Research Panel discussed the nature of parthenotes, it did not discuss why the prohibition on the use of parthenotes might present significant problems. Thus, congressmen, even if they had read the Human Embryo Research Panel's report, would not have appreciated the full effect of the DWA.
Finally, though the various presidential commissions have done an admirable job soliciting views of a broad range of scientists, ethicists, patients, and others, they still lack the formal notice-and-comment format that this Article proposes. The formal notice-and-comment mechanism with an invitation to participate extended to every interested individual, rather than just to those that the commission finds to be worthy of attention, will improve both the legislative process itself and the public perception of and confidence in the process.
V. CONCLUSION
Mark Twain once quipped, "suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself." 219 This Article is somewhat less cynical about Congress. One of its real problems, among others, is not idiocy, but lack of digestible, objective, and timely information on complex scientific and technical issues. In today's political environment where even scientific issues are politicized and the public trust in legislators is at an all-time low, 220 we sorely need a mechanism that provides unbiased assessment of legislative proposals while increasing public participation in the legislative process, diminishing the influence 218 Holt, supra note 178 (emphasis added). of special interests, and educating legislators on the complex scientific and technical issues. An independent, nonpartisan, CSO modeled on the CBO, which would provide an opportunity for the experts and public at large to weigh in with comments on the likely effect of the proposed bills on scientific issues and would evaluate these comments and produce reports "written in a language that is understood by members of Congress, and crafted by those who are familiar with the functions of Congress," 221 would go a long way toward improving the legislative process and reducing damage that haphazardly considered legislation can inflict on scientific progress. Therefore, creating a legislative notice-andcomment process would improve legislation and public confidence and would have beneficial effects on science. While Congress may not always defer to the concerns raised by the commenters or the staff at the CSO, the improved quality of congressional debates-and the increased accountability that will come with forcing Congress to confront explicit warnings of the scientific community-will be a marked improvement over the current process of legislating in matters of science and technology.
